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Mentally Retarded Employees in Day Care Centers in North
Carolina: The 1983 Amendments
The 1983 North Carolina General Assembly changed the carefully delin-
eated requirements for workers at North Carolina day care centers.' North
Carolina General Statutes sections 110-90.1 and 110-91 originally barred em-
ployment of those "mentally retarded or mentally ill to an extent that may be
injurious to children"; this wording was changed in 1983 to prohibit the em-
ployment of those "mentally or emotionally impaired to an extent that may be
injurious to children.' 2 Although this change appears merely to clarify the
language, 3 the amendment's title indicates a broader legislative intent: "An
Act to Remove Mental Retardation From the Conditions Prohibiting a Person
From Work in a Day-Care Center."4
As the Day Care Committee explained:
The Committee recommends legislation rewriting the term "mentally
retarded" from the conditions prohibiting individuals from being
proprietors of day care plans and facilities. There is no reason to
stigmatize the mentally retarded who are not dangerous. Those who
are, of course, remain excluded. 5
Thus, this amendment represents another measured step toward the equal pro-
tection and "normalization"' 6 of the mentally retarded, or, more broadly, the
handicapped. Considered with North Carolina's statute protecting the em-
ployment rights of the handicapped, this amendment further erodes the em-
1. An Act to Remove Mental Retardation From the Conditions Prohibiting a Person From
Work in a Day-Care Center, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 277 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 110-90.1, -91(8) (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.1 (CUr. Supp. 1983) provides:
No day-care plan shall be registered if that plan is operated by or employs any person
who has been convicted of a crime involving child abuse, child neglect, or moral turpi-
tude, or who is an habitually excessive user of alcohol or who illegally uses narcotics or
other impairing drugs, or who is mentally or emotionally impaired to an extent that may
be injurious to children.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(8) (Cure. Supp. 1983) repeats these qualifications and prescribes age
limits for employees and supervisors.
3. The original wording of the statute ("mentally retarded or mentally ill to an extent that
may be injurious to children") was somewhat ambiguous, since it might ban either all the men-
tally retarded or only those who might be injurious to children.
4. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 277 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-90.1, -91(8) (Cum.
Supp. 1983)).
5. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, DAY CARE-REPORT TO THE 1983 GENERAL As-
SEMBLY 7 (1983).
In 1979 the statute was amended to remove the upper age limit of 70. presumably out of
concern for employment of the aged. The legislature apparently has developed a similar concern
for the mentally retarded.
6. The principle of normalization, as established by the President's Committee on mental
retardation, entails" 'making available to the mentally retarded, patterns and conditions of every-
day life which are as close as possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream of society.'"
A. JACOBS, HANDBOOK FOR JOB PLACEMENT OF MENTALLY RETARDED WORKERS 16 (3d ed.
1979) (quoting B. NiRJE, THE NORMALIZATION PRINCIPLE AND ITS HUMAN MANAGEMENT IMPLI-
CATIONS. CHANGING PATTERNS IN SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED (President's Com-
mittee on Mental Retardation, 1969)).
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ployer's common-law discretion to hire and discharge whomever he pleases.7
Removal of the ban against employing mentally retarded day care workers
brings North Carolina's statutes closer to principles of federal law,8 but also
introduces some uncertainty over the extent to which an employer may choose
between mentally retarded job applicants and those of normal intelligence.
Although any initial, broad exclusion of the mentally retarded now is prohib-
ited, the amendment's symbolic effect probably will outweigh its practical
effect.
Recent antidiscrimination laws and other types of labor regulations have
restricted an employer's discretion in hiring and discharging employees;9 his-
torically, however, courts treated the employment relationship like any other
contractual relation.' 0 Absent statutory or contractual restrictions, the public
or private employer has the exclusive right to determine job qualifications for
various positions, and to hire and discharge employees at will. I I Unless the
employer's decisions violate the rights of a member of a protected class or
labor union, or the constitutional rights of an employee, courts tend to afford
the employer wide latitude in basic employment decisions.' 2 Thus, at com-
mon law an employer generally had no obligation to hire handicapped appli-
cants. Furthermore, an employer may discharge an employee with or without
cause absent statutory, contractual, or constitutional restrictions.1 3
7. At common law, the employer was free to hire whomever he desired, and to discharge "at
will" employees who did not have written employment contracts, with or without cause, hearing,
or explanation. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
8. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976 & Supp. V 1981), forbids
discrimination against the handicapped by any federally subsidized program. See infra notes 18-
23 & 50-51 and accompanying text.
9. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V
1981), forbids employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. The Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), and the Civil Rights Act of 1871,42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), also forbid employment discrimination based on race. The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982), prohibits employ-
ment discrimination against individuals between the ages of 40 and 70. The National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982), particularly § 158(a)(3), forbids discrimination against
employees for engaging in union activities. Finally, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-796i (1982), see infra notes 18-23 & 50-51 and accompanying text, forbids discrimination
on the basis of handicap. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATIoN LAW 1-
2 (2d ed. 1983).
10. Alliance Co. v. State Hosp., 241 N.C. 329, 332-33, 85 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1955) stated: "The
relation of employer and employee is essentially contractual in its nature, and is to be determined
by the rules governing the establishment of contracts, express or implied."
11. See, e.g., Charles City Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 291 N.W.2d 663
(Iowa 1980); Burton v. Crawford & Co., 89 N.M. 436, 553 P.2d 716, cerl. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558
P.2d 619 (1976); Mumford v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 47 N.C. App. 440, 267 S.E.2d 511
(1980); Tatum v. Brown, 29 N.C. App. 504, 224 S.E.2d 698 (1976).
Statutory restrictions on the employer's discretion to hire and fire employees usually are
drawn narrowly to address specific problems and not interfere unduly with the employer's right to
select or discharge employees. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46
(1936). See also Sioux Quality Packers, Div. of Armour & Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 153 (8th Cir.
1978).
12. See, e.g., Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976) ("A large
corporate employer such as General Motors, except to the extent limited by statute or contractual
obligations, must be accorded wide latitude in determining who it will employ and retain in em-
ployment in high and sensitive managerial positions.").
13. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Prince v.
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Federal and state laws, however, increasingly have restricted this broad
power, and recently the rights of the handicapped have been recognized and
protected. 14 Constitutional challenges to employment discrimination against
the handicapped generally have been unsuccessful. Although the Supreme
Court has not spoken directly on the subject, the lower federal courts generally
have not treated the handicapped as a suspect class. 15 Thus, any equal protec-
tion claims of discrimination are subject to the rational-basis test, which
merely requires an employer to show some rational, nonarbitrary basis for his
actions.' 6 Given the many potential difficulties and inconveniences of em-
ploying the handicapped, employers ordinarily have satisfied this test, and
thus equal protection claims usually have failed to enhance the employment
rights of the handicapped. 17 Furthermore, only state action can violate the
equal protection clause, rendering most employers' decisions immune to con-
stitutional challenge.
Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1979); Hodgin v. Noland, 435 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); Nantz v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 290 N.C. 473, 226 S.E.2d 340
(1976); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971); Wilkinson v. Erwin Mills, 250 N.C.
370, 108 S.E.2d 673 (1959).
A growing doctrine, accepted by some courts, prohibits an employee's discharge for activities
that public policy encourages, for example, objecting to an employer's illegal actions, filing a
worker's compensation claim or serving on a jury. See Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539
F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976), and cases cited therein.
14. For a general history of the treatment of the handicapped in society, see Allen, Historical
Overview: From Charity to Rights, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 953 (1977) (excerpted from R. ALLEN, LEGAL
RIGHTS OF THE DISABLED AND DISADVANTAGED 1 (1969)).
15. See, e.g., Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316, 322 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 976 (1982); Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1981); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 675-76 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980). See also B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 280 and cases cited therein.
One lower court has held that the handicapped are a suspect class, In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d
441, 447 (N.D. 1974), and another has suggested it in dicta. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp.
946, 958-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
16. The Warren and Burger Courts have developed a three-tier system of equal protection
analysis. A discriminatory practice is subject to strict scrutiny if it: interferes with the exercise of
a fundamental right, or affects a suspect class, a "discrete and insular minority." United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Employment has been held not to be a
fundamental right, so in employment discrimination cases the focus must be on the screened-out
class. Race, nationality, and alienage have been treated as suspect classes. In such cases, there is a
presumption against the discriminatory practice.
The second tier of scrutiny bars discriminatory practices that are not related substantially to
an important governmental objective. It is applied in cases involving a "semi-suspect" class, such
as women or illegimates.
The third tier of scrutiny determines whether a rational relationship exists between the prac-
tice and a legitimate governmental objective, and it applies to all other groups. See Burgdorf &
Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qua'lfcations of Handicapped Persons as a "Sus-
pect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 855, 899-910 (1975);
Comment, The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses: Two Means of Inplementing "Integra-
tionism"for Handicapped Applicants for Public Emp~'oyment, 27 DEPAUL L. REv. 1169, 1174-89
(1978). The handicapped usually are considered in this category. See cases cited supra note 15.
For commentaries advocating that all or some of the handicapped should be considered a suspect
class, see Burgdorf and Burgdorf, supra, and Comment, supra.
17. See cases cited supra note 15. One of the reasons for the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976 & Supp. V 1981), was "the lack of action in areas related to rehabilita-
tion which limit a handicapped individual's ability to function in society, e.g., employment dis-
crimination .... " S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2078.
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In 1973, however, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,18 pro-
viding handicapped plaintiffs a statutory basis for pursuing discrimination
claims. The Act states:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States,
.... ,shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . .9
"Handicapped individual" is defined as one who "(i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having
such an impairment .. ".. -o The Act requires employers to make "reason-
able accommodation" 21 for an otherwise qualified applicant or employee, in-
cluding restructuring physical facilities, modifying job duties, and altering
work schedules. 22 The employer is encouraged to consider each applicant in-
dividually, and although free to consider disability limitations, he may not
exclude categorically on the basis of handicap.23
This federal legislation has been accompanied by corresponding state leg-
18. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
21. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or
Benefiting From Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R § 84.12(a) (1983).
22. Id § 84.12(b).
The Supreme Court interpreted "reasonable accommodation" in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In Davis plaintiff had been denied admission to a nursing
program because of a severe hearing disability. Id at 402. The Court determined that the indi-
vidual attention plaintiff would require exceeded the "modification" required under the Act. Id
at 410. The Supreme Court cautioned against the precedential value of Davis, however, id at 412-
13, and courts have interpreted it to require a great deal of modification to accommodate the
handicapped. For example, in Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (1Ith Cir. 1983), the court held
that the employer had to accommodate the dyslexic plaintiff in administering a preemployment
test, usually given in written form. In Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982), the
court indicated that New York City must provide some type of accommodation for the handi-
capped in its mass transit system. A North Carolina federal district court, while requiringplain-
tiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies before continuing the litigation, implied that
requiring a school board to offer a summer school program for children with cerebral palsy would
not be unreasonable. Phipps v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 551 F. Supp. 732, 734
(E.D.N.C. 1982). ("Davis has been read as not prohibiting all affirmative action but only that
which would entail extensive modification of some existing program.") In Majors v. Housing
Auth., 652 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1981), the court remanded the case to determine whether a low
income housing authority should be required to break its rule barring pets to accommodate plain-
tiff's emotional disability that required the companionship of her dog. But see American Pub.
Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that a regulation requiring every
mode of mass transit to accommodate the handicapped was beyond the scope of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
23. According to B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 282-83, employers practicing
categorical exclusion have not prevailed under federal and state statutes without showing either:
(I) "[That all or substantially all persons in the handicap category could not do the
job," or
(2) That the exclusion was "justified by a high degree of human or economic risk, and
the potential for creating the risk be readily determined" by a less exclusionary handi-
cap or on an individual basis.
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islation. Most states24 have enacted legislation protecting the rights of the
handicapped, although the laws differ as to the types of handicapped people
protected,2 5 the extent of accommodation required,2 6 the type of preemploy-
ment inquiry or test allowed,2 7 and whether a private cause of action is cre-
ated.2 8 Generally, however, the state laws supplement and reinforce the
federal antidiscrimination legislation.
North Carolina has adopted antidiscrimination legislation for the handi-
capped. The overriding philosophy of the statutory scheme is to "encourage
and enable handicapped persons to participate fully in the social and eco-
nomic life of the State and to engage in remunerative employment. ' 2 9 The
statute specifically addressing employment states:
Handicapped persons shall be employed in the State service, the
service of the political subdivisions of the State, in the public schools,
and in all other employment, both public and private, on the same
terms and conditions as the ablebodied, unless it is shown that the
particular disability impairs the performance of the work involved.30
Handicapped persons are defined broadly as those with "physical, mental and
visual disabilities." 3'
The North Carolina statute has been involved in significant litigation only
once. In Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. 32 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that glaucoma, a potentially disabling condition, was not a visual
disability under the statute, and thus the statute did not bar the employer from
24. According to B. SCHLE1 & P. GROSSMAN; supra note 9, at 277 n.87, as of 1983, 48 states
had adopted laws restricting discrimination against the handicapped.
25. Eg., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983) forbids discrimination based
on a physical handicap or medical condition, such as cancer. VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1981) forbids
only discrimination based on physical handicap.
26. Georgia's statute explicitly states that the employer need not modify his physical facilities
or grounds to accommodate handicapped individuals. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-4 (1981).
27. Texas bars all preemployment tests with a disproportionate impact on handicapped ap-
plicants unless the test has been validated specifically for the job, or no other tests exist. TEX.
HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121.010(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984). Georgia's statute specifically permits
preemployment inquiry as to handicap, and rejections based on medical examinations, as long as
there is a "good faith reliance" on a doctor's evaluation. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3(c) (1981).
28. Although some statutes clearly provide a private cause of action, others are less clear. In
Dillon v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 43 Md. App. 161, 403 A.2d 406 (1979) the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals held that Maryland's statute did not create a private cause of action. The West
Virginia Appeals Court, however, in Hurley v. Allied Chem. Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757, 765 (W. Va.
App. 1980), found an implied private cause of action in the West Virginia statute. The court
rejected the argument that a private cause of action on the state level would invade an area dele-
gated exclusively to the federal government. Id at 764-65.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1982). The North Carolina statutes were passed in 1973, pre-
sumably to complement the federal Rehabilitation Act.
30. Id § 168-6 (1982). The statute could be construed to restrict discrimination only in the
"terms and conditions" of employment after hiring already has occurred, as opposed to restricting
discrimination in the hiring decision itself. The statute states, "Handicapped persons shall be
employed ... on the same terms and conditions as the ablebodied," (emphasis added) with no
mention of hiring. InBurgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979),
however, discussed infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text, the North Carolina Supreme Court
applied the statute to a hiring decision without mentioning that hiring was not treated specifically
in the statute.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1982).
32. 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979).
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refusing to hire any individual with glaucoma.33 Despite this somewhat unset-
tling result, the court suggested that the statute should be interpreted broadly:
"[Tihis statute, being remedial, should be construed liberally, in a manner
which assures fulfillment of the beneficial goals for which it is enacted and
which brings within it all cases fairly failing within its intended scope."'34
Given the apparent contradiction between the court's statement and its result,
the ultimate scope of the statute remains uncertain.
35
Aside from the apparent social benefits of employing the mentally re-
tarded, categorically excluding them from day-care centers might violate fed-
eral or state law. The federal statute36 forbids discrimination against the
handicapped by any program receiving federal financial assistance. A previ-
ous interpretation of the Act by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit limited its applicability to those programs receiving federal
funds for which the primary purpose was to provide employment. 37 The
United States Supreme Court recently rejected this view, however, holding
that the Act, by its own terms, applies to any program receiving federal aid, for
whatever purpose.38 Under this interpretation, North Carolina day-care cen-
ters' federal aid clearly would be threatened by policies that discriminate
against the handicapped in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 39
An employer might argue that the mentally retarded are unqualified to
work in day-care centers, and thus the discrimination is justified for business
reasons.40 This argument is weak, however, considering the extent to which
the retarded already are employed in day-care centers to some extent.4 ' Also,
33. Id at 528, 259 S.E.2d at 253.
34. Id at 524, 259 S.E.2d at 25 1.
35. The only other case arising under the statute is GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C.
App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979), a class action to restrict smoking in public places brought on
behalf of all those with pulmonary problems. The court of appeals held that the class involved-
all those with any pulmonary problem-was too broad to come under the definition of "handi-
capped." This decision, while also restricting the definition of "handicapped," arguably is less
questionable than Burgess because the class that the court declined to label "handicapped" in-
cluded many people with minor pulmonary problems, as opposed to the discrete groupd of those
with potentially disabling glaucoma in Burgess.
For a view that the North Carolina supreme court's definition of "handicapped" was too
restrictive in Burgess, and that the broader definition of the federal statute should apply, see Note,
Employment Discrimination-Judicial IdentFcation of the "Handicapped Person" in North Caro-
ina-Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 836 (1980).
36. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
37. Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 947 (1979).
38. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984).
39. According to a study of North Carolina day-care centers, 554 of the sample 2248, or
approximately 25%, of North Carolina day-care centers are labeled "subsidized" and 1694 of
2248, about 75%, are "nonsubsidized." Subsidized centers receive approximately 39% of their
income from government agencies and 12% from the federal Child Care Food Program. Nonsub-
sidized centers receive approximately 2% of their income from government agencies and 2% from
the Child Care Food Program, and to the extent that their actions might violate the federal law,
would be subject only to losing that small amount. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINIS-
TRATION FOR DAY CARE STUDY COMMITTEE, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, NORTH
CAROLINA DAY CARE COST STUDY, Day Care Centers, Final Report 53-58 (April 1983).
40. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
41. The frequency of jobs held by the mentally retarded are ranked as follows: (1) food
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given the number and variety of tasks required in a day-care center,42 the
requirement of "reasonable accommodation '43 under the federal law almost
certainly would require an employer to restructure his division of tasks to
place mentally retarded workers in positions for which they are unquestiona-
bly qualified.44
Presumably, the North Carolina legislature originally barred employment
of the mentally retarded to ensure high quality day care. Compared with the
day-care statutes of other states, North Carolina's legislative requirements are
remarkably specific, and set very high standards.45 The North Carolina law
basically adopts the somewhat controversial high staff-child ratios of the Fed-
eral Interagency Day Care Requirements of 1968.46 It bars the employment in
day-care centers of excessive users of alcohol, users of illegal drugs, and those
who have committed certain crimes.4 7 The statute even'states that: "Each op-
erator or staff member shall truly and honestly show each child in his care true
love, devotion and tender care."'4 8 The legislature's concern for high quality
day-care is commendable at one level.
This concern, however, probably was misplaced to the extent that it led
the legislature to bar the mentally retarded from working in day-care centers.
Of the few state laws that specify any requirements for day-care centers, few or
none bar the employment of the handicapped or the mentally retarded.49 Even
services; (2) building services (custodial); (3) domestic services; (4) groundskeeping; (5) office occu-
pations; (6) merchandising occupations; (7) building trades; (8) helpers in hotels; (9) helpers in
nursery schools; (10) helpers in hospitals. A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 20.
42. A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 193-94, 147-48, 174-75. The Nursery School Aide is listed as
having the following specific skill requirements: ability to coordinate work with other employees;
knowledge and observance of hazards to children; knowledge of basic rules and equipment for
indoor and outdoor games for children; knowledge of simple arts and crafts techniques and equip-
ment; ability to use simple cleaning equipment and supplies; ability to enforce simple rules;
knowledge of locations of equipment and supplies; ability to determine when to seek help in an
emergency; ability to handle food in a neat, sanitary manner, ability to interact well with young
children and adults; and ability to observe routines and procedures. Id at 194. For example, food
preparation, maintenance, and clerical work, as well as child care, are all necessary in day care
centers.
43. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., the following statutes, in which the legislature merely delegates responsibility
for establishing standards and requirements for day-care centers to an administrative agency or
board: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1527 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-
312 (1981); GA. CODE § 49-5-12 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 14, § 104 (1981); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 25.358(12) (Callaghan 1974); N.Y. Soc. SErv. LAW § 390 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-3-
80 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. § 4442a(l) (Vernon 1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-196
(1980); W. VA. CODE § 49-2B-4 (Supp. 1983).
46. 45 C.F.R. § 71 (1970) (no longer in effect). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-91(7) (1978) requires
one staff member for every eight children under the age of two, one for every twelve children ages
two to three, one for every fifteen children ages three to four, one for every twenty children ages
four to five, and one for every twenty-five children over the age of five. See also infra note 50 and
accompanying text.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-90.1, 110-91(8) (1978 & Supp. 1983).
48. Id § 110-91(10) (1978).
49. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-311 (1981) (establishing specific standards for in-home
care, requiring that staff members be between 21 and 70, in good health and have prior experience
in child care); VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3(3)(C) (1980) (requiring, for religious institution child care
centers, that supervisors be certified by physicians as free from any disability that would prevent
them from caring for children).
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the strict federal requirements for day-care centers receiving federal aid50 did
not bar the mentally retarded. Those standards merely stated: "Staff of the
facility and volunteers must have periodic assessments,. . . of their physical
and mental competence to care for children." 51 Mental "competence" could
refer to emotional stability or intelligence. This loose definition, therefore,
permitted flexibility in determining a standard of competence-mental retar-
dation could have been one of many factors taken into account. Thus, al-
though the North Carolina legislature undoubtedly meant well in originally
barring the mentally retarded from working in day-care centers, it seems to
have acted alone.
Given the competing policies-the broad common-law discretion of the
employer to hire and discharge his employees, the statutory rights of the hand-
icapped to equal opportunities in employment, and the desire to provide a
high level of child care-the change in the North Carolina law was a good
one. Removing the bar on employment of the mentally retarded would be
meaningless without the nondiscrimination requirement of the North Carolina
handicap law and the federal law. Taken together, however, the statutes re-
quire employers to consider each applicant individually. Rather than estab-
lishing a broad, bright-line test barring employment of the mentally retarded,
or requiring affirmative action in hiring them, considering applicants individu-
ally will provide more flexible accommodation of the competing interests
involved.
Removing this bright-line principle, however, will leave a vacuum of un-
certainty in individual employment decisionmaking. Consider an employer
faced with two applicants: one mentally retarded and one not, otherwise
equally qualified. Given that the employee could affect the intellectual devel-
opment of the children in the day-care center, may the employer justifiably
hire the applicant of normal intelligence on the grounds that he is more quali-
fied to develop the minds of the children? Arguably, unlike a qualification
such as race or, in most instances, physical handicap, mental retardation may
affect the quality of the work performance. Presumably, a careful evaluation
of the job position involved and the actual effect on the children should pre-
cede any decision not to hire the handicapped applicant. A position that pri-
marily involves supervision and playing with children probably would require
less intelligence than, for example, a teaching position. It is particularly diffi-
cult to draw this line in the day-care situation, as opposed to other occupa-
50. The Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements, established in 42 U.S.C. § 1397(a)
(1976) and 45 C.F.R. § 71.1-71.20 (1970), required high staff-child ratios (few children per
caregiver) in all day-care centers receiving Social Security Title XX funds. The standards pro-
voked a "storm of controversy" because of the costs of hiring additional staff. U.S. DEPT. or
HEW, NATIONAL DAY CARE STUDY, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 1(1978).
In Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Okla. 1977), a suit brought to enjoin enforcement of
the standards, parents argued that the standards would produce prohibitive costs, forcing them to
quit work to care for their children. Id at 801. The standards were considered "wholly unneces-
sary" for the care of children, imposing "severe financial burdens needlessly. . . ." Id at 800.
Although the standards were upheld in Stiner, Congress eventually repealed the requirements.
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, § 1001, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2655 (1980).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 71.16(i) (1970).
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tions, given the uncertainty inherent in the emotional and intellectual
development of children, and the employer's subjective evaluation of who will
work effectively with children.
The effect of removing the ban on mentally retarded day-care workers
will depend on the ultimate judicial interpretation of the North Carolina
handicap statute. Some state laws prohibiting discrimination against the
handicapped have been broadly interpreted and have had a significant effect,
while other state laws have been emasculated by the judiciary.52 The North
Carolina courts should construe the North Carolina handicap statute broadly,
requiring significant accommodation similar to that ordered in liberal inter-
pretations of the federal law.53 The courts should require an employer to
restructure his division of duties to take advantage of the mentally retarded
worker's skills. A mentally retarded worker who is interested in children has
as much to offer as any other employee, and should be as fully integrated into
the day-care system as possible. As noted by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Burgess, the handicap statute was adopted after years of undue dis-
crimination, and thus should be interpreted broadly to remedy any harmful
lingering effects.
54
Although the practical effect of the change in the day-care law in conjunc-
tion with the handicap law is uncertain, the symbolic effect of further includ-
ing the mentally retarded in society probably will exceed the statute's practical
effect. The removal of any stigma of the mentally retarded, however, is, in
itself, a worthwhile accomplishment.
55
NANCY KATHERINE PLANT
52. Compare Panettieri v. C.V. Hill Refrigeration, 159 N.J. Super. 472, 388 A.2d 630 (1978)
(burden on employer to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his action) and Kim-
mel v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 23 Wash. App. 78, 596 P.2d 1069 (1979) (plaintiff's knee injuries
held to be a handicap) with Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 67 Ill.
App. 3d 512, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978) (plaintiff's kidney transplant made him uninsurable under
defendant's self-insurance program, and thus defendant could discriminate legitimately against
plaintiff) and Providence Journal Co. v. Morgan, 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976) (plaintiff's
whiplash not a physical handicap within the Rhode Island statute).
53. See supra note 22.
54. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Representative Jeanne Fenner, from the Eighth
District of North Carolina, the sponsor of the amendment, stated that she did not consider the
amendment to be a jobs bill, but rather the removal of discriminatory language that perpetuated
the myth that the retarded were completely incompetent or dangerous.
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